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Abstract 
With the rise of the Internet, web applications, such as online banking and web-based email, have become integral to 
many people‟s daily lives. Web applications have brought with them new classes of computer security vulnerabilities, 
such as SQL injection. It is a class of input validation based vulnerabilities. Typical uses of SQL injection leak 
confidential information from a database, by-pass authentication logic, or add unauthorized accounts to a database. 
This security prevents the unauthorized access to your database and also it prevents your data from being altered or 
deleted by users without the appropriate permissions. Malicious Text Detector, Constraint Validation, Query length 
validation and Text based Key Generator are the four types of filtration technique used to detect and prevent the SQL 
Injection Attacks from accessing the database 
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1. Introduction 
Web applications enable much of today‟s online business includes banking, shopping, university 
admissions, email, social networking, and various governmental activities. They have become ubiquitous 
because users only need a web browser and an Internet connection to receive a system-independent 
interface to some dynamically generated content. No database is safe. An attack technique that has been 
widely used is Structured Query Language (SQL) Injection. SQL injection is a method for exploiting web 
applications that use client-supplied data in SQL queries. SQL Injection refers to the technique of 
inserting SQL meta-characters and commands into Web-based input fields in order to manipulate the 
execution of the back-end SQL queries [3]. The data web that applications handle, such as credit card 
numbers and product inventory data, Successful SQL injection attacks enable malicious users to execute 
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commands in an application's. In this paper, we introduce a novel technique for the detection and 
prevention of SQLIA‟ s. Current technique consist four types of validation model approach specifically 
designed to target SQLIA‟s. The key intuition behind our technique is: (1) malicious text detector is used 
to detect and prevent the wildcard, which is used by the attacker to attack the database. 2) Userid and 
Password have constraint in Login phase 3) Generating ASCII value in database for the sensitive data‟s as 
UseridASCII and PasswordASCII to secure the database from the attackers. 
1.1. Techniques of SQL Injection Attacks 
An SQL Injection Attack is a code injection technique that exploits a security vulnerability occurring in 
the database layer of an application. The vulnerability occurs if the user input is either incorrectly filtered 
for string literal escape characters embedded in SQL statements or the user input is not strongly typed. 
 
Tautology 
A website uses this source (figure 2), which would be vulnerable to SQLIA. For example, if a user 
enters“‟ OR 1=1--” and“”, instead of Userid =“Raja” and Password = “rani”, the resulting query is: 
 
 SELECT * from FROM User_info WHERE userid=‟‟ OR 1=1 --‟ AND password =‟‟ 
 
The database interprets everything after the WHERE token as a conditional statement, and the inclusion 
of the “OR 1=1” clause turns this conditional into a tautology. As a result, the database returns the records 
for all users in the database. An attacker could insert a wide range of SQL commands via this exploit, 
including commands to modify or destroy database tables. 
 
Remote execution of stored procedures 
This category of attack is conducted by executing the procedures, stored previously by the web 
application developer. Following is an example 
 
 “„; SHUTDOWN; -- “to any of the input field, the query generates as given below: 
 
Query = “Select accounts from User_info WHERE Userid = „„; SHUTDOWN; -- password=‟„; 
 
Illegal/ Malicious Queries 
Attackers gathers sufficient information from the error display on web application thus the attacker gain 
more information about the database schema , this helps the attacker by using SQL Injection Attack 
technique to access the web applications Labs. 
2. Related work 
Su and Wassermann [1] proposed a solution of static analysis of an SQL statements using parse tree 
validation, they used that static structure how to filter the user input and generate the input validation 
code. They conducted a study using five open-source Web application projects on GotoCode.com, the 
same five projects used by [3], and applied their wrapper, SQLCHECK, to each application. They found 
that their wrapper stopped all 18,424 SQLIA‟s in their attack suite without generating any false positives 
and it may not contain all possible attacks. The parse tree approach is effective in identifying the structure 
of the SQL statement and using structure comparisons to detect potential SQLIAs. However, the parse 
tree approach focuses on the structure of the attacks instead of the removal of the SQLIVs. 
In [3] [6] [7] secure vulnerable SQL statements by combining static analysis with statement generation 
and runtime monitoring. Their solution, AMNESIA, analyzes a vulnerable SQL statement, generates a 
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generalized statement structure model for the statement, and allows or denies each statement based on 
how it compares to the model at runtime. Their solution throws an exception for each SQLIA, which the 
developer handles and builds in attack recovery logic. They found that their solution stopped all of the 
SQLIA‟ s in their attack set, a set ranging from 140 to 280 elements for each application, without 
generating any false positives. Their model generation and runtime comparison approach is effective at 
detecting SQLIA‟s and does a comparison similar to SQLGuard. AMNESIA, like SQLGuard, also adds a 
computational overhead by including an additional process that has to be integrated into the runtime 
environment. Additionally, AMNESIA adds the capability for developers to add logic to how SQLIA‟s 
are handled, by throwing an exception in the vulnerable code. Sun [8] proposed an effective approach for 
detecting and preventing SQL injection attacks. Author claims that the proposed technique satisfy the 
following points, (1) is resistant to evasion techniques, such as hexadecimal encoding or inline comment, 
(2) does not require analysis or modification of the application source code, (3) does not need training 
traces, (4) does not require modification of the runtime environment, such as PHP interpreter or JVM, and 
(5) is independent of the back-end database used. 
2.1. Positive Tainting and Syntax Aware Evaluation  
In this approach valid input strings are initially provided to the system for detection of SQLIA. At 
runtime, it categorizes input strings and propagates the untrusted or other-than-trusted markings based on 
the initialization. After that, a „syntax aware evaluation‟ is performed for evaluating the propagated 
strings. Thus, based on the evaluation, if untrusted strings are found, such queries are restricted from 
passing into the database server for processing. During initialization of the trusted strings, it performs 
identification and marking based on inputs. The strings are categorized as: (i) hard coded strings, (ii) 
strings implicitly created by Java and (iii) strings originated from external sources. In case of syntax-
aware evaluation, it performs syntax evaluation at the database interaction point. Syntax defines the trust 
policies which are the functions defined by the web programmer. Functions perform pattern matching and 
if the result of matching gives positive outcome, the tool allows the query to be executed on the database 
server. Following issues are there in this method: 
 
(i) Initialization of trusted strings is developers dependent 
(ii) Persistent storage of trusted strings may cause second order attack [2] 
2.2. Prepare Statement 
SQL provides the prepare statement, which separates the values in a query from the structure of SQL [4]. 
The programmer defines a skeleton of an SQL query and then fills in the holes of the skeleton at run time. 
The prepare statement makes it harder to inject SQL queries because the SQL structure cannot be 
changed. To use the prepare statement, we must modify the web application entirely; all the legacy web 
application must be re-written to reduce the possibility of SQL injections. Other approaches against 
SQLIA‟s rely purely on static analysis. Wassermann and Su [1] propose a technique that combines static 
analysis and automated reasoning to detect whether an application can generate queries that contain 
tautologies. This technique is limited, by definition, in the types of SQLIA‟s that it can detect. 
3. Proposed Defensive mechanism in Static Level Validation  
Current approach is the combination of static analysis with runtime validation. In the static analysis stage, 
the prevention technique represents in three level phases Malicious Text Detector, Field Constraint 
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Validation and Static Query Length Validation. In runtime validation stage, the user input data is 
validated with all these stages and results the user input as safe or unsafe. 
3.1. Malicious Text Detector 
1. Statically build a model for preventing Meta characters (figure 1) 
2. Detect the susceptibility character which is appended with the user‟s data and prevent the 
malicious attacker from accessing the web application.  
 
Function wildChars(ByVal strWords) 
        Dim arr1 As New ArrayList 
        arr1.Add("select") 
        arr1.Add("--") arr1.Add("drop") arr1.Add(";") arr1.Add("insert") arr1.Add("delete")                          
        arr1.Add("xp_") arr1.Add("'") 
        Dim i As Integer 
        For i = 0 To arr1.Count - 1 
                   strWords = Replace(strWords, arr1.Item(i), "", , , CompareMethod.Text) 
        Next 
        Return strWords 
End Function 
 
Figure 1: Sample code for Malicious Text Detector 
 
Sample 1 state that as malicious query, the user input data is pattern matched with malicious text detector 
and detects the wild card character (--); throw an exception as an SQLIA‟s.  
 
Sample1: Select * from user_info where Userid =‟INDIRA‟- -„and password=1007 
          
            user_valid1 = obj1.stripQuotes(UCase(„INDIRA‟- -„))  
            user_valid2 = obj1.killChars(„INDIRA‟- -„) 
            pass_valid1 = obj1.stripQuotes(0) 
            pass_valid2 = obj1.killChars(0) 
            corr_userName = „INDIRA‟ 
            corr_password = 0 
 
Field Constraint Validation 
Login phase is set with constraint as User id is allowed only the ten characters; Password is allowed only 
four characters shown in (figure 2). 
   
 len_username = Len(„INDIRA‟)  len_password = Len(0) 
 If len_username = 10 And len_password = 4 Then End If 
 
Figure 2: Sample code for 'CONSTRAINT VALIDATION 
4. Proposed SQLIA - Protector Mechanism 
Because of high level security the proposed scheme consists of three filtration phases with static and 
dynamic level. First level phase is Malicious Text Detector, Second level phase is Constraint Identifier, 
Third level phase is Static Query Analysis and the Fourth level Phase is Text based Key Generator. 
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Figure 4: Proposed Architecture for ASCII based String Matching technique 
4.1. Underlying Principle in Run time Monitoring  
During runtime, the user input data‟s are compared against the corresponding filtration techniques used to 
check for their validity. The dynamically generated user inputs are not satisfied with all the three level of 
filtration technique then they are flagged as malevolent else legitimate user and allowed to access the web 
application.  
4.2. Text based Key Generator  
1. Converting User input in to ASCII code 
2. Searching the availability of converted ASCII in Data table and returns valid Userid and 
Password, 
3. Here four parameters are maintained in database server that is Userid, password, ASCII Userid 
and ASCII password (Table 1) 
 
USERID PASSWORD USERID ASCII PASSWORD ASCII 
INDIRA 1007 7378688265 49484855 
RANI 1008 82657873 49484856 
ARUN 1009 65828578 49484857 
JEGADISH 1011 7469716568738372 49484949 
 
Table 1: ASCII conversion of Sensitive Data in Data Tables 
 
This proposed technique is used to validate the user input with static and run time analysis to detect and 
prevent SQLIA‟ s. Figure 4 shows that the user input data enters in the Login phase from the web 
browser, Application Server acts as a middleware to filter the SQLI. The first level phase: When the user 
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input enters inside the login mode, the malicious text detector is used to detect the susceptibility character 
which is appended with the user‟s data and throw an exception that the user as a malicious attack and 
prevent from accessing the web application. In the Second level phase the login phase is set with 
constraint such as User id is allowed only the ten characters and the Password is allowed only four 
characters. So the user input is compared with this constraint if this level satisfies the data will be 
converted as SQL Query with database engine and start to compare with third level. In the third level 
phase Length of the number of possibility queries is stored in the array format in statically generated 
method. Each  character is parsed and number of static Query is counted and stored in a static model then 
the input data is also calculated with the existed static value and compared if it matches it moves to the 
last phase otherwise it will be rejected as SQLIA‟s. 
5. Comparison with Existing Techniques 
Existing technique such as Eliminating SQL Injection Attacks [5] shows that static analysis is processed 
by using SQL Graph representation using FSM. In AMNESIA [3] static model build SQL-query models: 
For each hotspot, build a model that represents all the possible SQL queries that may be generated at that 
hotspot. A SQL-query model is a non-deterministic Finite - state automaton in which the transition labels 
consist of SQL tokens (SQL keywords and operators), delimiters, and place holders for string values. The 
existing technique [8] [5] is fully Query based validation but the current technique is data based 
validation in Static and Runtime validation to secure the web application. The execution time shows that 
the current technique results a better performance than existing mechanism as well as the computational 
cost is also minimum compared to this existing mechanism. 
5.1 Result and Discussion 
 The Table 2 provides comparison of detection and prevention overhead for the proposed technique 
with existing technique [5] [8]. The proposed ASCII based string matching is developed by using two types 
of databases, SQL Server and MS Access. The detection overhead and prevention overhead is calculated by 
using the formula (5.1 and 5.2). The Figure 6 (a) and (b) provides comparison chart for detection and 
prevention overhead for the proposed technique with query based technique [5] [8]. The following equation 
is used for calculating detection and prevention overhead. 
 
Detection Overhead = Tdetection/Tround-trip    (5.1) 
 
Where Tdetection is time needed for detecting malicious characters in the user input and Tround-trip is 
the response time for completing a single query of the proposed scheme. 
Prevention Overhead = Tprevention/Tround-trip    (5.2) 
 
Where Tprevention is the time delay needed to prevent the malevolent. The Tround-trip is the round-trip 
response time for completing a single query execution. 
6. Conclusion 
The technique combines static and dynamic analysis in the static analysis stage, the prevention technique 
represents in three level phases Malicious Text Detector, Field Constraint Validation and Static Query 
Length Validation.  In runtime validation stage, the user input data is validated with all these stages and 
results the user input as safe or unsafe. This prototype tool that implements our technique for .NET based 
web applications; Current technique was able to stop all of the 500 attacks that we performed on the 
considered applications without producing any false positive for the 1500 legitimate accesses to the  
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applications. This technique was able to correctly identify all attacks as SQLIA‟s, while allowing all 
legitimate queries to be performed. This proposed technique is able to stop all the attacks that performed 
on the considered applications without producing any false positive. 
 
 
Database Type Technique 
Detection 
overhead per 
query in ms 
Prevention 
overhead per 
query in ms 
Average 
Detection 
overhead in ms 
Average 
Prevention 
overhead in ms 
SQL Server 
ASCII Based String 
Matching  
≈11 ≈18 ≈9.6 ≈24.2 
Transparent Defense 
Mechanism [41] 
≈19 ≈25 ≈18.5 ≈29.4 
SQLPrevent [57] ≈18 ≈24 ≈17.7 ≈28.6 
MS Access 
ASCII Based String 
Matching  ≈15 ≈18 
≈17.2 ≈24.2 
 Transparent Defense 
Mechanism [41] ≈21 ≈32 
≈24.25 ≈29.7 
SQLPrevent [57] ≈18 ≈27 ≈22.7 ≈25.8 
 
Table 5.2: Comparison of Detection and Prevention Overhead for ASCII based String Matching Technique with Existing 
Techniques 
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Figure 6: Comparison Chart for Detection and Prevention Overhead for ASCII based String Matching Technique with Existing 
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